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(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to develop-
ment;
(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez
Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled
by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable
provisions for the payment of sums found to be due."
We then have a very lengthy document, a unilateral Declaration
by Egypt to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the
date of April 24, 1957. In this declaration, Egypt declares that:
It remains the unaltered policy and firm purpose of the Govern-
ment of Egypt to respect the terms and the spirit of the
Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the rights and obliga-
tions arising therefrom. The Government of Egypt will continue
to respect, observe and implement them. 13
It also states that they want "To afford and maintain free and unin-
terrupted navigation for all nations within the limits of and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of
1888." "4 This contemplates the Canal Code, forbids discrimination,
provides procedure for handling complaints, and states that this
declaration is an international instrument to be deposited and regis-
tered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.
Well, this completes then my brief presentation of the docu-
mentary survey of the Suez Canal.
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The Suez Canal being at the crossroads of power politics, the
problems involved would be complex enough even if the United
Arab Republic and Israel were friendly. Their enmity and economic
dependence on others, who are themselves in competition, compound
the complexity to the nth degree. Without a settlement supported
by the great powers no form of control-national or international-
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ported by Egypt and Israel and the dominant powers, the form of
control would become less important but for the fact that control
of the Canal by any single country could, even under the most
favorable circumstances, becomes intolerable to others. It follows
that the prospect of continuing exclusive national control of the
Suez Canal could be the stumbling block to the needed underlying
settlement.
In contrast, the prospect of international control could promote
solution of the primary problems of the Middle East. This then is
my thesis: that the promise of international control of the operation
of the Suez Canal would promote reconciliation of the hereditary
rivalries between the neighboring peoples and the competing interests
of the great powers. Such reconciliation would in turn make inter-
national control workable and make it a force for maintaining peace
and promoting prosperity in the area.
In the late 1940's, while the Greek case was before the Security
Council and later the General Assembly, I acted as legal counsel to
the Greek Mission to the United Nations. On a number of occasions,
Gromyko and Vyshinski took positions at odds with what would
have strengthened their case. I could not understand the reason for
their action unless it was dictated by some extraneous consideration.
Discussing the matter with an American statesman, I advanced the
theory that the positions taken were dictated by domestic politics;
and then advanced the generalization that 30% of the difficulties in
international relations were caused by domestic politics.
"No, John, you're wrong."
"Well, in my limited experience that has been, I think, the case."
"No, John, you're wrong. The percentage is not 30, it is 99."
Domestic politics certainly contributed to the failure of the
Suez Conference in August 1956. The Egyptian abrogation of the
franchise of the Suez Canal Company had put Anthony Eden in
a most awkward position with his own party. A strong element had
opposed the treaty of 1954 under which British troops were with-
drawn. A group of conservatives were said to have won a com-
mitment that if Egypt interfered in any way in the Company's oper-
ations, the British Government would take military measures. Mr.
Eden felt he had to do so and he did put British troops on the
alert. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking as the Chief Delegate for the
United Kingdom, accused Nasser of having announced that the Canal
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would be operated with only Egyptian interests in mind. The British
press called Nasser a Little Hitler.
Similarly, the Premier of France felt his political future required
harsh words designed to discredit Nasser; and Christian Pineau,
Chief Delegate for France, went out of his way to describe Nasser
as a dictator toward whom France had "shown extraordinary pa-
tience . . . despite his interventions in the Algerian problem."
The United States failed, in my opinion, to set an example
which would have made it easier for Nasser to accept the recom-
mendations of 18 of the 22 nations attending the Suez Conference.
Our Chief Delegate, John Foster Dulles, played a leading role in
proposing international control of Suez but declined to act on the
suggestion that we should accept for the Panama Canal what we were
proposing for the Suez Canal.
Nasser was, of course, whipping up public opinion in Egypt
to counter the personal attacks from abroad. When he declined to
agree to the proposed international regime, the reason he gave was
that Egyptian public opinion would not tolerate it. He described
the proposed plan as "a form of collective colonialism."
Since August 1956 there has been progress. In October of that
year Egypt supported a Security Council resolution setting forth six
requirements for any settlement of the Suez question. A most im-
portant one was the following: "The operation of the Canal should
be insulated from the politics of any country." Complete insulation
of the Canal from the politics of every country is a goal that is
impossible of attainment, but it is an agreed goal. The form of
operation that most nearly approaches that agreed goal is the most
appropriate. A standard has been established by which to measure
which is better-national or international control.
Another step forward since 1956 is the agreement by the nego-
tiators for Panama and the United States to accept bilateral control
of the existing Panama Canal. If the proposed treaty is signed and
ratified by the United States, that action will set a precedent that will
make it easier for Egypt to share with others responsibility for keep-
ing the Suez Canal as much as possible out of domestic and world
politics.
A compelling reason for the decision of the policy makers in
our Government to share control of the Panama Canal has been to
insulate it as much as possible from Panamanian politics. Exclusive
control of the Panama Canal by the United States has inflamed the
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politics of the Republic of Panama. The aspirants to political office
feel they must outdo one another in denouncing administration by
the United States of the Canal Zone. One has to visit the Zone for
only a day and see the contrast between the neat and prosperous
Zone and the adjoining crowded areas in Panama City to under-
stand how easy it is to whip up sentiment against exclusive American
control.
Experience at Suez has demonstrated in a different way that
exclusive control by the territorial sovereign is not conducive to
insulating the Canal from domestic politics. National control has
made that Canal the football of international politics as well.
In 1954, when the Security Council called on Egypt to permit
the passage through the Canal of Israeli vessels, the Foreign Minister
sought to justify the denial, saying "that public opinion in Egypt was
strong against allowing Israeli ships through the Canal, and that even
the use of Egyptian troops might not be enough to insure passage."
The existence of exclusive control can furthermore be an
embarrassment to any government even when it wants to keep a canal
insulated from its domestic and foreign politics. Rival political parties
are bound to goad the party in office into using the power it has over
such canal as a bargaining weapon. Ostensibly friendly neighbors
are apt to do the same. The irresponsible governments of Syria and
Algeria are said to have pushed Nasser into going further than he
wanted to go to keep leadership in the Arab world. His power to
drive Israel to desperate measures by threatening to cut off all access
to the Red Sea had, he felt, to be exercised. The result has been
disastrous for his country.
If national control is not conducive to insulation from politics,
will international control be any better? The answer lies, I think, in
the kind of international control that is adopted.
The governing body must be so constituted that responsibility
as well as authority is concentrated. Professor Baxter in his admirable
book entitled The Law of International Waterways mentions a variety
of structures which might be considered. One, which he quickly dis-
misses, is a body responsible to the General Assembly of the United
Nations. This of course would be folly-even with the General
Assembly constituted as it was before its recent packing with unstable
and splintering newborn nations. There is something to be said, by
the way, for Eric Severeid's comment that they should have been
given the vote only after reaching twenty-one.
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The structure I have in mind would be a separate international
juridical entity established by a multilateral convention to which the
territorial sovereign or sovereigns and the principal users of the Canal
are parties. Its structure would be comparable to that of the World
Bank and, like the Bank, it could be called a specialized agency of
the United Nations.
There would be-as contemplated in the proposed Panama
Canal treaty-a single Director General responsible for carrying out
the provisions of the multilateral treaty and rules laid down in con-
formity with that treaty by a Board of Directors elected by the parties
to the treaty who subscribed to stock in the company. As with the
World Bank, each stockholder would have a voice in the choice of a
single director, the smaller stockholders joining together as they do
in the Bank. The territorial sovereign would be assured of one and
perhaps more directors, the largest users would each have one and
various geographical areas not otherwise represented would each have
one.
So far as possible, the persons to serve on the Governing Board
would be insulated from politics and the Director General would have
to owe his loyalty exclusively to the international corporation and
the governing convention.
The convention would provide for authority to operate the
Canal and to administer an area to be defined bordering the Canal
and perhaps the course of the fresh-water feeder canals. The World
Court would have compulsory jurisdiction to settle any complaint
by the United Arab Republic or any other party to the convention
that the Governing Board or the Director General was acting contrary
to the convention.
The question of securing the Canal from land or sea attack
must be faced, difficult as it is. Professor Baxter discounts the value
of a guarantee of neutrality by the principal powers, but for what it
is worth, such a guarantee should, I believe, be included in the con-
vention. Day-to-day policing should be by a special force responsible
to the Director General but made up as much as possible-as the
staff generally should be-of Egyptians, as at present.
We come now to the feasibility of an international regime.
Today, no; next year, perhaps; sometime, yes. Forces already
at work will some day convince the Egyptians that such an arrange-
ment is to their interest.
The Canal does not enjoy the monopoly it once did. For
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passenger travel and no small amount of freight, the air has taken
its place. The lack of confidence in the continuous availability of
the Canal has led to other means of transporting the oil that constitutes
its principal traffic. The possibility of another closure after 1956
led to the building of very large tankers. Some of these can round
Cape of Good Hope more economically than they could pass through
the Canal, assuming it were deep enough to take them. Israel is
reported to be building a pipeline from the Gulf of Aqaba to the
Mediterranean through which oil can be pumped at commercially
competitive costs. Lybia is capable of supplying oil in quantities such
as to reduce significantly dependence upon oil formerly passing
through the Canal.
The economic loss to Egypt from playing politics with the
Canal has been and continues to be disastrous. The Egyptian people
cannot be expected to put up indefinitely with a government that
refuses to accept the advantages open to it.
The subscriptions to the stock of the Canal Corporation would,
in my view, be substantial and would in large part be paid over to
Egypt together with the Canal tolls not required to maintain and
improve the Canal. It might be possible for Egypt to borrow from
the World Bank enough to free it from dependence on the Soviet
Union. This could be done on the security of the subscriptions
pledged by the member governments as well as the tolls. The
aggregate of the subscriptions would be large enough to help Egypt
to free itself from its present fiscal bondage, yet the cost to the
subscribing governments would be reasonable when measured against
the cost to them of wars and threatened wars in the Middle East.
Of course, the agreement of more countries than Egypt would
be necessary to establish international control. In the long run it is
to be hoped that the Soviet Union and the Western Nations will see
that it is to their separate interests to phase out their rivalries in the
Middle East. The prospect of international control of the Suez Canal,
as I suggested at the beginning, could well help them to accommodate
their interests and thus promote the settlement of the underlying
issues tormenting the Middle East.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. I
